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Workplace Justice 
Without Unions
NOTE: This article draws upon research from the 
authors’ book, Workplace Justice Without Unions, 
which was published last year by the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research. See http://www
.upjohninstitute.org for information on how to order 
the book. 
“Where there is no rule of law 
but only the command of persons, where 
secrecy and arbitrariness reign, where one 
never knows when or why the axe will 
fall, there justice weeps” (Wolterstorff 
2001).
Human dignity at the workplace 
requires the right to just treatment by 
those holding authority. At the crux of 
this is protection from arbitrary action— 
action that is based upon personality 
rather than merit, and is not predictable 
on any reasoned basis. When a human 
being is treated as merely a means 
to an end, a thing to be employed by 
others, rather than as a person deserving 
justice, justice does indeed weep. This 
is especially true where a person’s job is 
at stake. In our society, an individual’s 
job is not only the source of economic 
goods, but also an important part of 
how we defi ne ourselves—and others 
defi ne us—and our role in society. Where 
workers can be terminated from their 
employment for any reason, or none 
at all, arbitrariness reigns. Yet, this is 
historically the basic principle of the law 
of employment termination in the United 
States.
Corporations are social organizations 
arranged in a hierarchy in which those 
at the top exercise authority over those 
at the bottom. This inevitably means 
that control must be exerted over those 
who are employed by others. In such 
circumstances, both human nature 
and differing interests between the 
employed and the employer give rise to 
a situation in which an abuse of power 
is not only possible, but highly likely. 
In the workplace there are order givers 
and order takers. One instrument of 
control by order givers is the threat 
of termination of the relationship. 
Ultimately, employees who do not behave 
as they are ordered will be separated from 
the organization—fi red.
Fortunately, since the days when 
the employment-at-will principle was 
adopted by American courts in the late 
nineteenth century, there has been a 
considerable erosion of it. What has 
occurred over a period of about 90 
years is the construction of a patchwork 
of limitations on employment-at-
will. Yet, the employer’s power is 
still quite substantial. Arguably, it has 
grown signifi cantly by virtue of some 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
approving employer-mandated arbitration 
(employment arbitration).
The Practice of Workplace Justice
A major development in the area of 
workplace justice has been the adoption 
of organizational justice procedures by 
nonunion employers. The more advanced 
forms of these procedures have come 
along relatively recently. Based on 
data gathered in the late 1970s, Fred 
Foulkes (1980) found that by far the most 
common employer device for handling 
employee grievances at that time was 
the open-door policy, which is a very 
rudimentary workplace justice procedure. 
More advanced forms of nonbinding 
policies have included 1) installing 
an ombudsman, a corporate employee 
who independently deals with worker 
problems; and 2) mediation, where a 
neutral third party works to facilitate a 
resolution of the dispute.
An especially interesting 
organizational justice procedure 
originated in the 1980s—peer review 
panels. Here, a panel of employees (and 
sometimes managers) makes a fi nal 
decision or recommendation regarding an 
employee’s grievance. 
The management-initiated 
organizational justice system to 
most recently rise to prominence is 
employment arbitration. In employment 
arbitration, a nonunion employer requires 
employees to agree to submit any 
complaints (or sometimes any allegations 
of violation of law on the part of the 
employer) to a neutral arbitrator who 
will render a fi nal and binding decision 
on the matter.  This is by far the most 
controversial of these systems. The 
fairness of employment arbitration has 
been vigorously attacked on the grounds 
that it deprives employees of their legal 
right to go to court, and to a jury trial, 
and substitutes an employer-mandated 
system that is set up and controlled by the 
employer. 
Design of the Study
There is a substantial literature on 
workplace justice; much of it relates 
to employment arbitration. However, 
a systematic analysis of this literature, 
while useful, fails to produce any solid 
conclusions with respect to the main 
questions of interest. To remedy this, 
we have gathered an extensive body of 
new data in an attempt to move toward 
clearer answers to the issues inherent 
in these systems. The empirical portion 
of our study has several aspects. First, 
in order to judge the substantive results 
obtained under these various procedures, 
we analyze overall win/loss rates by 
employees in a sample of termination 
cases in labor arbitration and employment 
arbitration and in a sample of cases from 
federal courts. 
Our second and most intensive 
research strategy is our attempt to 
determine the degree to which the same 
result would be reached in the same cases 
across different types of decision makers. 
This is tested by posing hypothetical 
scenarios to labor arbitrators, 
employment arbitrators, managers, 
members of peer review panels, jurors in 
employment discrimination cases, and 
labor court judges from other countries. 
By analyzing the responses to these 
scenarios, we can compare the harshness 
or leniency of the systems toward 
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employees for different disciplinary 
offenses, and the criteria used to reach 
decisions.
Results
Existing studies that evaluate 
workplace justice systems by looking 
at the win/loss rates by employees and 
employers show that the results are 
mixed. Probably the most striking result 
is the low percentage of employee wins 
in discrimination cases in federal courts. 
When we analyzed data on win/loss 
rates from our own sample of arbitration 
awards and recent reports of federal court 
decisions, we obtained the results set out 
in Table 1.
Although comparing the overall 
win rate of employees in employment 
arbitration with those in the other 
two procedural alternatives is of 
some interest, the most meaningful 
comparisons are between results in 
particular categories of employment 
arbitration cases and other systems. Our 
most pertinent comparison is of court 
cases involving claims of discrimination 
in violation of a federal statute and 
employment arbitration cases involving 
that same claim.
In employment arbitration cases 
where a federal discrimination statute 
was involved, employees won 22 percent 
of the cases. This compares to only 12 
percent in federal district courts in the 
most recent fi ve-year period. Thus, the 
chances of an employee winning would 
appear to be much greater in employment 
arbitration than in court when the case 
goes to a fi nal adjudication. However, 
this does not take settlements into 
account.
In labor arbitration cases under a 
collective bargaining contract, unlike 
court cases enforcing a federal statute, 
the employer has the burden of proving 
misconduct and the propriety of the 
penalty. Usually the standard is proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
However, more serious cases may require 
proof by clear and convincing evidence, 
or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The principal limitation on the kind 
of analysis described so far is that it 
does not hold constant the nature of the 
cases decided upon in the various justice 
systems. It is to this limitation that the 
most intensive portion of our research 
addresses itself. This stage of our study 
consists of developing hypothetical cases 
on termination of employment and asking 
different types of decision makers to 
indicate whether they would fi nd in favor 
of the employer or the employee if they 
were deciding the case. We attempted not 
only to discover tendencies to decide in 
favor of either employees or employers, 
but also to determine what were the 
important factors that infl uence different 
decision makers. The decision makers 
to whom these hypothetical cases were 
posed included employment arbitrators, 
labor arbitrators, peer review panelists, 
human resources offi cers, persons who 
had served as jurors in discrimination 
cases, and labor court judges from several 
countries.
The results of our work on 
hypothetical cases are complex. One 
relatively simple set of fi ndings that 
provides something of an overall view of 
the results indicates that, in response to 
our hypothetical cases, the percentage of 
cases decided in favor of employees was 
greatest by labor arbitrators (55 percent) 
and labor court judges (51 percent); 
lowest for employment arbitrators, 
both when they were deciding statutory 
claims (25 percent) and when they were 
applying a “for cause” requirement in 
a contract of employment (33 percent); 
and in between these extremes for HR 
managers (46 percent), peer review 
panelists (45 percent), and jurors (38 
percent). So, holding constant the 
particular cases decided produces results 
that are quite different from the results of 
looking at overall win/loss rates as we do 
in Table 1. These bare results, although 
useful, should be viewed with some 
caution, and should be understood in the 
context of the complete body of results 
and analysis. 
Professors Hoyt Wheeler, Brian Klaas, and Douglas 
Mahony are faculty members at the Moore School 
of Business, University of South Carolina.
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Procedure Percent employee wins Percent employer wins
Employment arbitrationa
Overall
   n = 216
33 67
Federal discrimination statute involved
n = 59 22 78
Employment contract
n = 52 56 44
Burden of proof on employer
n = 57 60 40
Labor arbitrationb






n = 53,248 16 84
Table 1  Employee/Employer Win Rates
a SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994–2002; American Arbitration 
Association, Employment Dispute Arbitration Reports, 1999–2000.
b SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994–2002.
c SOURCE: Federal District-Court Civil Cases, 2001. See http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090.
